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Reputation and 
Production Standards 
Jill J. McCluskey and  Maria L. Loureiro 
This paper analyzes a monopolist's behavior when consumers cannot observe the 
production standards. These types of products are  usually known as  credence goods. 
The steady-state level of quality with credence goods is found to be lower than that 
with experience goods, and perfect information goods. The finding that only per- 
ceived quality, which is  effectively a filtered version oftrue  quality, affects reputation 
indicates rewards for high quality production are lower in the credence good case. 
Further, an  increase in the  level of monitoring can increase the  true level of product 
quality in the market for credence goods. 
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Introduction 
Food products with claims of usage or nonusage of specific production standards have 
become a more important part of consumer food purchases in recent years. Eco-labeled 
products, which claim to use environmentally friendly production methods, have become 
very popular in Europe and are  gaining prominence throughout the  world. In  Japan and 
Europe, food products are being sold with claims that their ingredients have not been 
genetically modified. There are also products with claims stating they were produced 
using sound animal welfare practices, such as "cruelty-free" cosmetics. As Noe  and 
Rebello (1995) discuss, there are  many "ethical" production standards, such as  products 
with claims they were produced without child labor. 
In each of the above examples, the buyer cannot determine the  validity of the seller's 
claim (i.e., the quality) by visual inspection or by consuming the product. Products with 
production standard claims are  fundamentally different from products where quality is 
observable or where quality can be determined after consumption.  Such products are also 
called "credence goods" (Darby and Karni, 1973).' Asymmetric information problems 
occur with unobservable production standards because producers know whether they 
used the appropriate methods to achieve the desired quality attributes, but consumers 
only know with certainty what the producers' quality claims are or what the label says. 
If  a product has unobservable-quality  attributes, then its reputation becomes very 
important. Consumers will only be willing to pay more for claims of the use of special 
production standards if they trust the validity of the claim. 
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Although production standards  are  sometimes a binary choice (such as  satisfying 
organic production standards or not), here we consider a continuous choice of quality, 
which may be more appropriate to reflect the distribution of the  perceived quality levels 
by consumers. Further, meeting buyers' special product requirements may be better 
represented by a continuous choice of quality. Finally, from a product purity standpoint, 
the continuous choice of quality level is appropriate. For example, a recent Consumers 
Union-led study of government data found pesticide residues on 23% of organic  produce. 
One sample of certified organic peaches contained 3.3 parts per million of the pesticide 
phosmet, suggesting the crop was sprayed shortly before harvest (Brasher, 2002). One 
approach for hedging against conviction is to engage in fraud while simultaneously 
maintaining legitimate production of the premium product (Hamilton and Zilberman, 
2003). The firm that produces both a fraudulent and a true premium product is more 
likely to escape detection than a firm that produces only a fraudulent product. On the 
other hand, it may be the firm is not actively engaging in fraud, but instead not taking 
sufficient care to preserve the identity of the premium product. 
In this paper, we analyze firm-specific reputations for goods with claims that 
unobservable production methods or standards were used. The analysis complements 
Shapiro's (1982) pioneering work on reputation and product quality. Shapiro analyzes 
a monopolist's behavior when consumers cannot observe quality attributes before 
purchase but can observe quality attributes after purchase, e.g., an experience good 
(Nelson, 1970). To achieve results comparable to those of Shapiro, we employ many of 
the same assumptions-specifically,  it  is assumed the  firm is a monopolist that controls 
the quantity as well as quality of the good in question. The major difference is that in 
addition to the information lag which is associated with the goods analyzed by Shapiro, 
we include monitoring of compliance  with production standards  claims (product quality), 
assumed here to be effectively imperfect. We assume it would be too expensive for each 
individual  consumer to monitor the  compliance  of each production standard. As a result, 
reputation is only an indirect function of true quality because true quality is filtered 
through consumer perceptions about quality.2 
With unobservable production standards, only perceived quality affects reputation, 
suggesting that rewards (e.g., higher prices) for compliance with production standards 
claims are  lower than the case in which quality is observable after consumption. Specif- 
ically, in Shapiro's work, the rewards for quality are discounted relative to the perfect 
information good owing to the lagged nature of  quality discovery. In the unobservable 
production standards case, in addition to the discount from the lag, the rewards are 
further discounted because only perceived quality is observed. 
The analysis presented in this paper contributes to the literature on product quality 
by including unobservable production standards in a reputation model, thus extending 
Shapiro's (1982)  finding^.^ With the recent evolution of food markets, goods with 
unobservable quality attributes are attracting attention from economists. Ligon (2001) 
presents a sequence of models in  which different assumptions regarding product quality 
A reviewer highlighted the importance of the divergence between buyer perceptions of certified standards and actual 
practices. For example, Delate (2000) acknowledges  that many organic farmers in Iowa use flame-burners  as an additional 
tool in their weed management practices because herbicides are not allowed.  Most organic shoppers would likely be surprised 
by this fact, yet remain unaware because they do not inquire about the production practices behind an organic certification. 
We do not review the extensive literature on product quality and reputations. For a survey of this literature, see Tirole 
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and its observation by consumers are made. He concludes that when a grading system 
(which transmits objective information about any of the quality dimensions of the pro- 
duct) is applied to markets in which quality is unobservable by consumers, the quality 
of  the produced commodity is higher. Using an infinitely repeated non-cooperative 
game-theoretic model, McCluskey (2000) shows imperfect monitoring can support an 
equilibrium in which organic food (based on production standards)  is available. 
Feddersen and Gilligan (2001) use a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to find 
that  an  information-supplying "activist" can support equilibria in which firms differen- 
tiate their products with unobservable characteristics. Hamilton and Zilberman (2003) 
analyze the incentives for fraud in a dual production framework in the presence of 
imperfect monitoring and imperfect enforcement. The intent of the current study is to 
build on the contributions of these earlier works through the introduction of a model 
that specifically considers product reputation. 
The Model 
In  order to focus on the consumer information issues  rather than the  interaction of these 
issues with competition, we analyze the monopolist case.4 The industrial organization 
literature suggests  that  quality  regulation (such as  product safety)  cannot be considered 
independently of market structure (Daughety and Reinganum, 1997). The monopolist 
case also allows for direct comparison with Shapiro's (1982) results. At each point in 
time, the product's reputation,  R,  determines the location of its  (inverse) demand curve, 
p(x,  R). Reputation is a dynamic process which depends on past levels of perceived 
quality. The monopolist chooses the  true level of quality, q(t),  and quantity,  x(t), over 
time to maximize profits. Production costs are given by c(x, q). The variable denoting 
consumers' perceptions of product quality, ij, is a function of both true quality and the 
level of quality assessment (probabilistic) or monitoring, m. The level of monitoring is 
normalized to be between zero and one, inclusive. If rn = 0, then there is  zero monitoring 
effectiveness, while if m = 1,  then observability is perfect, and the certifiers report all 
fraudulent claims to consumers. If m is between zero and one, then there is imperfect 
monitoring, which increases in effectiveness as the level of m increases. 
We are interested in imperfect monitoring, since imperfect monitoring is a better fit 
with reality compared to perfect monitoring. In general, not all of the imposter organic 
produce will be detected in the  certification process. For example, as  Fetter and Caswell 
(2002) point out, organic certifiers may believe the reputation of the entire industry 
depends on how consumers perceive their integrity as  a group, and thus they would be 
reluctant to report wrongdoing by another certifier. 
'  The classic papers on quality choice by a monopolist under perfect information are Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976). 
Both conclude that the provision of quality may be over- or undersupplied relative to the socially optimal level, depending 
on the shape of the  inverse  demand cwe  in quality. The deviation between the socially optimal level of quality and the profit- 
maximizing level of quality is explained by the fact that monopolists choose based on the marginal consumer, while social 
welfare requires the effect on the average consumer to be considered. Therefore, at  a given quantity level, the monopolist's 
quality is too low ifand only ifthe effect on the marginal buyer is less than the effect on the average  buyer (see Spence, 1975, 
p. 419; and Shapiro, 1982, p. 27). Further, the choice of  quality may interact with the amount of  quantity restriction if the 
price elasticity is dependent on quality. If quality for the monopolist under perfect information is underprovided, then the 
informational problems we introduce with unobservable-quality goods will aggravate the welfare problems. If quality for the 
perfect information monopolist exceeds the socially optimal level, then introducing information problems may improve social 
welfare. As Shapiro (1982) points out, this is  an  example of the second best with two imperfections counteracting each other. 4  April2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
We also presume that the level of monitoring is set outside the firm, which allows us 
to focus on quality and information issues. This is the most common case for food 
industries, rather than the  exception.  For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
rather than the individual firms, sets standards and monitoring levels for organic food. 
The European Union does the same for Protected Geographical Indication labels. 
The relationship between perceived quality and monitoring, Q,(q,  m), is assumed to 
be positive up until Q(q, m) = q, and then it becomes negative. The intuition is that 
increases in monitoring cause the level of perceived quality to approach the level of true 
quality. Finally, we assume Q(q, 0) = 0. Based on this latter assumption, when there is 
no monitoring, consumers perceive quality to be the lowest level, which is normalized 
at zero. The rationale is that without monitoring, the consumer does not know the 
quality of  the product even after purchase. Consequently, there is no incentive for the 
producer to spend money on quality when it is not possible for the consumer to punish 
the producer by not purchasing the product in the future in response to a false quality 
claim (Ligon, 2001). These assumptions about perceived quality are consistent with 
Grossman's (1981)  paper on product quality disclosure.  According to Grossman, if sellers 
hold back information, consumers will assume  that quality is the lowest level consistent 
with what the sellers have disclosed. Thus, monitoring plays the role of product quality 
disclosure in our analysis. 
In Shapiro's (1982) analysis, reputation is based on past quality levels. In contrast, 
reputation in our analysis is based on past levels ofperceived quality. This is the differ- 
ence between an experience good and an unobservable-quality good (or credence good). 
Specifically,  in Shapiro's analysis, after consumption, consumers know the true quality 
of  the product. In the current analysis, since we are dealing with product standards, 
true quality remains unobservable even after consumption. 
Reputation changes over time as a function of  perceived quality and quantity, R = 
f  (x, a(q,  m) -  R). The rationale for including quantity in the reputation state equation 
is that the greater the amount produced with a deviation in perceived quality from the 
current reputation, the greater will be the effect on reputation. In the extreme, if no 
product is produced, there should be no change in reputation, fx(O, Q(q, m) - R) = 0. 
Following Shapiro, we assume that f  (x, 0) = 0 and fXG,  0) = 0. There is no change in 
reputation when perceived quality is equal to current reputation. Further, there is no 
change in reputation when perceived quality is equal to current reputation, and there 
is a marginal change in quantity. The product's initial reputation, R,, is taken as exog- 
enous. We model two particular cases in which consumers' perceptions of quality do not 
correspond with true quality. For the first part of the analysis, it is assumed consumers 
underestimate true quality, and later we assume the opposite occurs, whereby consumers 
overestimate true quality. 
Case 1: Consumers Underestimate Quality 
For this first case, we assume perceived quality is below true quality, Q(q, m) < q, and 
0 5 $(q,  m) < 1. The monopolist faces the following control problem: 
max j'=e-"[~(x,  R) - c(x, q) - ~]dt, 
x(t),q(t)  0 
s.t.:  R  = f(x, @(q,  m) -  R) and R(0) = Ro, McCluskey and Loureiro  Reputation and Production Standards  5 
where G(x, R) = xp(x, R) is the gross revenue function, c(x, q) denotes the production 
costs, and F  represents fured certification costs. The associated current-value Hamilton- 
ian is written as: 
The necessary conditions for an interior solution (assuming it exists) are as follows: 
The second-order conditions are assumed to be satisfied (see the appendix). 
In  order to achieve results comparable to Shapiro's findings, we focus our analysis on 
the steady-state equilibria for each classification of good. The steady state  occurs when 
R = 0, so that Q(q, m) = R, and 1  = 0. Since f,(x,  0) = 0, we have: 
Eliminating 1,  a steady state is obtained in (x, q), determined by (8)  and 
The perfect information pair (x*,  q*)  satisfies the steady-state equations, (8) and (lo), 
with  the term  in  parentheses on the  right-hand side, (l/(q",(q, m)))  + (rl(  fq(x, O)q",(q, m))), 
equal to one, and true quality (q) in place of perceived quality (p ). The experience good 
pair (xe,  qe)  satisfies these equations with pq equal to one, and true quality (q) in place 
of perceived quality (a ). If a, is equal to one, it means there is no transformation from 
true quality to perceived quality. Therefore, with Qq = 1, an  unobservable-quality good 
is equivalent to an  experience good in  terms of the  way quality affects reputation. If both 
a,  = 1  and rlfq  goes to zero, then the unobservable-quality good solution converges to the 
perfect information case. For the experience good steady-state solution, Shapiro showed 
the  quality level must  be less than  the perfect information case, q *.  We now compare the 
unobservable-quality good steady state with the experience good steady state. 
THEOREM  1. So  long as  reputation haspositive value andperceived quality is of  the 
form p(q, m) = b(m)q, where b(m) is a real-valued and continuous function, any 
steady-state quality level for an  unobservable-quality good must lie below both the 
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Proof. Since Shapiro (1982, p. 31, theorem 5)  proved that any steady-state quality 
level of an experience good must lie below the perfect information quality level, we 
need to show there is a further reduction in quality when going from the experience 
good to the unobservable-quality good (see the appendix for proof of theorem 1). 
Given Shapiro's result, our result implies the following ordering of product quality in 
the steady state for the three types of  goods classified by the consumer's information 
level at  the moment of the purchase and after consumption: 
(11)  qPS<  qe  < q*, 
where qPYs  the quality level of the production standards  good or credence good, qe  is the 
quality level of the experience good, and q  * is  the perfect-information quality level. This 
result is consistent  with Shapiro's (1982,  p. 22) summation about reputation and product 
quality: ". .  . since reputation adjustment can reward high quality production only with 
a lag, the firm will not find it profitable to provide so high a quality as under perfect 
information." Because only a filtered version of quality affects reputation in the case of 
unobsewable-quality goods, the rewards for high quality  production are lower than  with 
experience goods. Specifically,  with experience goods, the rewards are discounted due 
to lagged quality information. In the unobservable-quality good case, in addition to the 
discount from the lag, the rewards are further discounted because true quality is filtered, 
and only perceived quality is observed. 
Shapiro considered the effect of  a change in the "speed of  consumer learning." An 
increase in the speed of  learning diminishes the time lag of the reward for high quality 
production in Shapiro's model. The effect of a change in the speed of learning (or similar 
effects, such as randomness in learning) is somewhat similar to a change in the trans- 
formation from true quality to perceived quality-i.e.,  they both affect the rewards to 
quality. Consistent with our analysis, Shapiro reports that as the speed of  learning 
increases, so does the steady-state quality. However, the speed-of-learning parameter 
and the perceived quality transformation are inherently different concepts. Next, we 
consider the effect of a change in monitoring on steady-state quality. 
THEOREM  2. If the shift in the marginal revenue curve caused by  an increase in 
perceived quality, G,,,  is sufficiently large in the production-standards  good case, 
then an increase in the level of  monitoring will increase the true level of  product 
quality in the steady state. 
Proof. The proof of theorem 2 is provided in the appendix. 
This result is related to the previous result-i.e.,  as  monitoring increases, the 
unobservable-quality good becomes more like an experience good. With increases in 
monitoring, the distortion from true quality to perceived quality diminishes. 
Case 2:  Consumers Overestimate Quality 
The second case to be examined is one in which consumers overestimate quality by 
assuming that &(q,  m) > q and &,(q, m) > 1. Under these assumptions, an increase in McCluskey and Loureiro  Reputation and Production Standards  7 
monitoring lowers the level of perceived quality, 4,  < 0,  because increased monitoring 
causes perceived quality to converge to true quality. There can be overestimation of 
quality with most credence goods. For example, there could be overestimation of quality 
in organic foods if consumers believe the  level of pesticide residue is always zero, where- 
as there are sometimes positive levels of pesticide residue. 
We now consider how overestimating quality affects the results stated in theorems 
1  and 2. First, since qq(q,  m) > 1  now holds, the returns to quality in terms of perceived 
quality will be reduced when going from the quality standards or credence good to the 
experience good. Consequently, under this set of assumptions, the steady-state quality 
level is actually higher for the credence good  compared with the experience good. 
Similarly, if the shift in the marginal revenue curve caused by an increase in perceived 
quality, G#,,  is sufficiently large in the credence good case, then an increase in the level 
of monitoring will now decrease the true level of product quality in the steady state. The 
intuition for both of these reversals of results is that the returns to true quality are  now 
magnified by the overestimated level of perceived quality. When the returns to true 
quality are lowered, as they would be in going to the experience good level or if mon- 
itoring is  increased, then the firm will choose a lower level of quality in the steady state. 
The results under the assumption of  overestimation of  quality are counterintuitive 
because, as Shapiro (1982, p. 27) writes about his analysis, "imperfect information will 
tend to cause a reduction in the quality of products provided." Under this alternative, 
improving consumers' information actually decreases the level of quality. 
Directions for Future Research5 
Alternative Approaches to Formation 
of  Quality Perceptions 
The model discussed above is structural and allows us to analyze the classic reputation 
model with the new information scenarios that are increasingly important in differen- 
tiated product markets, especially in food products. However, this model is agnostic 
about where the initial perceptions of quality come from and how they may be formed. 
Alternative approaches should address whether individuals believe quality claims until 
proven false, or conversely, whether they inherently disbelieve quality claims until they 
are proven true. Initial perceived quality could alternatively be modeled with a random 
variable. Consumers could have a statistical expectation about current quality, which 
would be updated as  new quality information is revealed. 
A second modeling issue is the distribution of  beliefs among consumers. A spatial 
model with a distribution over beliefs about quality is likely more appropriate than a 
representative  consumer model. Some consumers may be skeptical,  and others  may 
be willing to believe. Given these issues, in future research we expect the impact 
of  monitoring will depend heavily on (a) how many consumers care about the 
quality attribute,  and (b)  the  distribution  of perceptions of quality among those who 
care. 
We  thank an anonymous reviewer for these suggestions. 8  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Strategic Use of  Third-Party Monitoring 
and Choice of Quality Claims 
Strategic use of third-party monitoring based on consumer perceptions of  quality may 
be an  interesting area of inquiry. Not surprisingly, if monitoring is  not mandatory, firms 
should strategically choose whether they will submit to monitoring. Profit-maximizing 
companies do not have an incentive to exceed their quality claims. The discovery by a 
monitor that a company has exceeded its quality claims will not make the evening 
news-i.e.,  monitoring is unlikely to raise quality perceptions beyond the point of the 
claim. However, if a company is monitored by a third party and fails to meet the quality 
standard,  its reputation will be damaged. If the company exceeds the quality standard, 
its reputation will remain constant. Therefore, when consumers are optimistic about 
quality, the producer is  best advised to avoid certification (or evade legal scrutiny of the 
product's claims), and hence avoid the possibility of failing to meet claims. Under pessi- 
mistic quality perceptions, the firm will choose third-party certification. 
As for strategically setting  the level of quality claims, Grossman (1981)  concludes that 
if sellers are  required to be truthful in any disclosures they make about product quality, 
they will fully disclose the true level of product quality. Extending this line of research, 
one could examine how firms set quality claims in a dynamic setting with imperfect 
monitoring and variable consumer perceptions of quality. 
Conclusions 
Products with claims of  using special production standards that are unobservable to 
consumers have become an increasingly popular marketing strategy to tap into con- 
sumer demand for healthier, safer, and  more environmentally  friendly products. Product 
labels often explicitly make claims about the production methods or ingredients, which 
are unobservable to consumers. As  a result, there are often problems of  asymmetric 
information that can affect the markets for these products. Since consumers cannot 
observe true quality even after consuming the product, there must be some reward 
mechanism for encouraging firms to produce high quality. Outside monitoring is one 
approach. Monitoring can create the proper incentives for firms to provide high-quality 
goods with production standard claims. 
Monitoring allows reputation effects to increase the  incentives for quality. Monitored 
claims allow consumers to make repeat-purchase decisions based, to some extent, on 
past quality. Therefore, firms have a greater incentive to maintain high quality. Findings 
of this analysis reveal the steady-state level of quality with unobservable production 
standards is  lower than that  with experience goods. When only perceived quality affects 
reputation, the rewards for high-quality production are lower in the unobservable pro- 
duction standards case. Further, an increase in monitoring can increase the true level 
of  product quality in the market for goods with unobservable production standards. 
The above results are consistent with Shapiro's (1982) general finding that product 
quality will be lower if reputation offers reduced returns for high-quality production 
compared with the perfect information case. In Shapiro's work, the rewards for high- 
quality production are discounted due to the lagged nature of experience goods. In our 
analysis, in addition to the discount from the lag, the rewards are further discounted 
because true quality is filtered, and only perceived quality is observed. McCluskey and Loureiro  Reputation and Production Standards  9 
This analysis has highlighted an important result: Because the production of quality 
is not fully rewarded when unobservable production standards are used, the steady- 
state of  care provision is below that of  goods with lagged-information characteristics. 
This finding suggests that in order to achieve a desired threshold of  quality in the 
market of unobservable production standards (such as food safety attributes), a form of 
direct regulation may be required. Thus, reliance on monitoring implemented by certi- 
fiers or third-party organizations clearly may not be sufficient to assure a certain level 
of  quality provision when unobservable production standards are used. 
As products with unobservable-quality  attributes are increasingly  marketed, process 
attribute information issues and their implications for markets will continue to gain 
prominence. Further research is needed to more fully understand these markets and 
information issues and to evaluate policies. 
[Received March 2004;final revision received December 2004.1 
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Appendix: 
Proof of Theorems 1 and 2 
Second-Order Conditions 
The sufficient condition for a maximum requires that the Hessian matrix of  the Hamiltonian with 
respect to the Lagrange multiplier (L),  the control  variables (q,  x),  and the state  variable (R)  is negative 
definite when evaluated at  steady-state levels  of q *,  x *,  and R *. The Hessian matrix of the Hamiltonian 
is given by: 
For negative definiteness, the necessary and sufficient condition is that the determinants of the princi- 
pal minors must alternate in sign. We  assume this holds. 
Proof of Theorem 1 
Since Shapiro (1982,  p. 31, theorem 5) proved that any steady-state quality level of an experience good 
must lie below the perfect information quality level, we need to show there is a further reduction in 
quality when going from the experience  good to the unobsemable-quality good or credence good. Under 
the current set of  assumptions, the value of  Q, ranges from zero to one (not including one) in the 
unobsemable-quality good case, and 4, = 1 in the experience good case. To show there is a further 
reduction in quality when going from the experience good to the unobsemable-quality good, we must 
consider how a change in the magnitude of the effect of  true quality on perceived quality, Q,, affects 
steady-state quality. For this theorem, it is assumed that Q(q, m)  = b(m)q.  By holding the level of 
exogenous monitoring constant, we can  state that  Q, = b.  In moving from an unobsemable-quality good 
to an experience good, the value of  b will increase. Therefore, the sign of  the derivative ((dq)l(db))  is 
critical. Linearizing text equations (8)  and (10)  and allowing the magnitude of b to exogenously change, 
we obtain a system of equations in the matrix form AdX = kd(gq): 
dx  fq  + r  db.  G44~-cqq[~+~]][dq]=-~q[7]]  f4dq  fq% 
The derivative ((dq)l(db))  can be calculated using Cramer's Rule: 
The second-order conditions ensure the numerator will be positive. The denominator can be signed as 
positive if the shift in the marginal revenue curve caused by an increase in perceived quality, G,,,  is 
sufficiently large. If this holds, the derivative ((dq)l(db))  > 0,  as required. 
Proof of  Theorem 2 
By linearizing  text equations (8)  and (lo),  which describe  the steady state  in  (x,  q),  a system of equations 
is obtained in the matrix form AdX = kdm: McCluskey and Loureiro  Reputation and Production Standards  1 1 
The derivative ((dq)l(dm))  can be calculated using Cramer's Rule: 
(A4) 
The derivative ((dq)/(dm))  can be signed as positive as required if the shift in the marginal revenue 
curve caused by an increase in perceived quality, Go,, is sufficiently large. 
G, -  c,  -Cxg 
c rf-  c  r  G- =CQX +Q  -5 
9%  a,  aqf:  aqfg  ~,e-c,s[y]  -cqq[a+i)  fgoq 
dx 
Idol 